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6 Abstract 
A functional description of the Apollo lunar module environmental control subiystem is presented. 
Development, test ,  checkout, and flight experiences of the subsystem are discussed; and the de- 
sign, fabrication, and operational difficulties associated with the various cohponents and subas- 
semblies a r e  recorded. Detailed information is related concerning design & a g e s  made to, and 
problems encountered with, the various elements of the subsystem, such a s  the thermal control 
water sublimator, the carbon dioxide sensing and control units, the water sfct,on, and so forth.  
The problems associated with water sterilization, water/glycol formulation1 and materials 
compatibility a r e  discussed. The corrective actions taken a r e  described wih tie expectation that 
this information may be of value for  future subsystems. Although the main xpwiences described 
a r e  problem oriented, the subsystem has generally performed satisfactorilTin flight. 
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APOLLO EXPERIENCE REPORT 
LUNAR MODULE ENVI RONMENTAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM 
B y  R icha rd  J. Gi l len,  James C. Brady, and  F r a n k  Co l l ie r  
Manned Spacecraft Center  
SUMMARY 
The experiences at  the subsystem level of the lunar module environmental control 
subsystem are summarized to assist the operational development of a future similar 
subsystem. The subsystem concepts used were generally well established; however, 
the specific hardware designs were new. 
caused by some relatively common procedure that had not been performed to the proper 
quality level or to a requirement that, at that time, could not be defined in sufficient 
detail. 
As a generalization, most problems were 
INTRODUCTION 
The development of the lunar module (LM) environmental control subsystem (ECS) 
required some improvements in the state of the art and was  successfully accomplished. 
In the interest of preserving history and of perhaps benefiting designers of future sys- 
tems, some of the development problems a r e  recounted. It should be noted that many 
of the problems a r e  of a subtle type that appear only after the hardware is used re- 
peatedly in many different ways. In many cases, the problems were resolved by chang- 
ing a procedure of use rather than by redesigning the item. This approach was used 
when it was felt that the unit was very sound and that the benefit of experience with a 
less-than-perfect unit would be better than rebuilding to get a new, untried, "perfect" 
device with possibly new problems. The experience gained from use of the ECS is a 
very significant and positive asset. 
DESCRI PTlON OF THE LUNAR MODULE ENVIRONMENTAL 
CONTROL SUBSYSTEM 
This section describes the lunar module ECS from a functional standpoint. The 
ECS configurations of the LM-3, LM-4, and LM-5 were all substantially the same with 
the following exceptions. 
1. The LM-3 vehicle was equipped with developmental flight instrumentation, and 
the ECS contained additional equipment-cooling provisions for this instrumentation. 
2. The LM-5 (Apollo 11) lunar landing vehicle and later vehicles included suit- 
liquid- cooling provisions to enhance the crewman- cooling capability. These provisions 
were substituted for  the cabin heat-exchanger assembly. 
The complete schematic diagram of the LM-5 ECS is shown on prime contractor 
drawing LDW 330-55000, which can be obtained from the NASA Manned Spacecraft 
Center (MSC), Houston, Texas. This drawing shows par t  numbers and detailed fluid 
and electrical schematics. 
In summary, the LM-5 ECS was divided into the following functional sections. 
1. Atmosphere revitalization section (ARS) 
2. Oxygen (02) supply and cabin pressurization section (OSCPS) 
3. Heat transport section (HTS) 
4. Water (H20) management section (WMS) 
Atmosphere Re vita I izat io  n Sect ion  
The ARS (fig. 1) removes heat, moisture, odors, and carbon dioxide (COz) from 
the suit circuit of the two astronauts and provides the required atmosphere circulation. 
One of the two suit fans circulates the warm, moist, suit-circuit gases through the 
backup heat exchanger to the primary heat exchanger. The backup unit is a suit gas-to- 
water sublimator and is used only if the primary coolant circuit fails. The primary 
heat exchanger is a gas-to-coolant fluid (water/glycol) unit. The gas, which has been 
cooled below the dewpoint, enters  the selected water-gas centrifugal separator. (An 
identical unit is provided for  redundancy. ) These rotary devices are powered by the 
suit-circuit gas stream. The water is coalesced and thrown to the periphery where it 
enters a pitot tube, through which the water is delivered first to the WMS and then to 
the HTS for use in heat rejection. 
The suit gas may next be reheated, if required, by warm water/glycol in a re-  
generative heat exchanger activated by a manual valve. The regenerative heat ex- 
changer is functional only on the primary cooling circuit. Each crewman has a 
suit-isolation valve, which is normally open except during extravehicular operations. 
These fast-acting suit-isolation valves close automatically if the suit-circuit pressure 
becomes dangerously low. This safety feature functions if the space suit of one crew- 
member is torn or otherwise malfunctions while the cabin is depressurized. The crew- 
member with the good suit can then take corrective action. 
Flexible hoses deliver the conditioned gas to each astronaut and return the gas to 
the ECS for processing again. The gas is normally diverted to the pressurized cabin 
for  circulation and is returned to the A R S  through the cabin-gas return check valve. 
The gas next enters the primary replaceable filter cartridge that contains lithium hy- 
droxide (LiOH) to remove carbon dioxide and activated charcoal to remove odor. A 
secondary filter cartridge, which is identical to the cartridge used in the backpack o r  
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Figure 1. - Atmosphere revitalization section simplified schematic. 
portable life support system (PLSS), is normally used only when the primary cartridge 
is being changed. This cartridge change is preplanned to occur at a convenient time in 
the mission. A carbon dioxide sensing device is included in the ARS to assess the con- 
dition of the cartridges. Other items of instrumentation are provided to ensure optimum 
subsystem operation and safety. 
Supplemental cooling also is provided to the astronauts for  periods of high meta- 
bolic heat rates by circulating cool water through plastic tubing, which is a part  of the 
undergarments. The same undergarments provide cooling during extravehicular opera- 
tions. The liquid-cooling assembly uses a pump, an accumulator, and a temperature 
control valve to bypass the cooling water around the liquid-to-liquid heat exchanger. 
Oxygen Supply and Cabin Pressur iza t ion  Section 
Gaseous oxygen is stored in the LM descent stage for  use during the descent and 
lunar stay phases, and a small  amount of gaseous oxygen is stored in the LM ascent 
stage for  use during the lunar ascent phase and during rendezvous and docking with the 
command module. A simdified schematic of the OSCPS is shown in figure 2. The 
PLSS 
2800-psi descent oxygen ;upply is regulated 
to 900 psi by redundant regulators. Re- 
dundant bypass relief valves protect the 
descent oxygen tank against overpres- 
surization. Redundant low-rate over- 
board relief valves protect the section 
downstream of the regulators against ex- 
cessive pressure caused by a defective 
regulator o r  by flow through the bypass 
relief valves. A reseating burst disk 
provides high-rate relief for failed-open 
regulators. 
The descent oxygen supply and the 
redundant ascent oxygen supply are mani- 
folded through manual shutoff valves lo- 
cated in the cabin. The shutoff valves a r e  
mechanically interlocked to prevent the 
premature use of ascent oxygen. The 
900-psi descent oxygen is available for 
backpack recharge through appropriate 
valves and fittings. 
Suit-circuit absolute pressure (and, 
therefore, cabin absolute pressure) is 
controlled by two manually selected, re- 
dundant regulators, both of which a r e  
normally activated. These automatic 
aneroid valves have electrical interlocks 
To s u i t  loop 
repressu r izat ion 
module 
oxygen tank Ascent oxygen tank 
Ascent stage lnterstage 
Descent stage ?disconnect 
rel ief valve diaphragm 
High-pressure I 1  
assembly 
I 
I 
0 Descent oxygen tank 
R denotes redundant component. 
Figure 2. - Oxygen supply and cabin 
pressurization section simplified 
schematic. 
with the cabin repressurization valve to permit cabin depressurization when desired. 
The cabin repressurization valve can be manually or automatically actuated to res tore  
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. . .  
cabin pressure rapidly. A cabin relief and dump valve is provided on both LM hatches 
for  automatic overpressure control and for controlled cabin depressurization. 
Heat Transport  Section 
Heat f rom various Sources is rejected by the sublimation of water (ice) to space 
vacuum. Two closed loops car ry  a circulating solution of 65-percent water and 
35-percent corrosion-inhibited ethylene glycol through heat exchangers and electronics 
cold plates and through the respective sublimators. Figure 3 is a simplified schematic 
of the HTS. The water/glycol is circu- 
lated at the nominal 250-lb/hr primary 
loop flow rate  by one of two pumps. The 
suit heat e x c h a n g e r  and the low- 
temperature electronics cold plates are 
cooled in  parallel. Next, the flow passes 
to the liquid-cooled-garment heat ex- 
changer and then to the high-temperature 
electronics cold rails. These cold plates 
and cold rails are carefully arranged in a 
series-parallel  network with necessary 
flow control orificing to provide the proper 
unit. 
Coolant 
thermal environment for each electronic recirculator assembly 
The primary sublimator rejects the 
collected heat, and the coolant absorbs the 
R denotes redundant component. waste heat from the batteries before re- 
turning to the fi l ter  and to the pump, at  
which point the circuit is complete. The 
secondary coolant loop is substantially 
the same, except that the primary guid- 
ance equipment is not cooled and only a 
single pump is provided. 
sublimator and not by the secondary coolant circuit. 
Figure 3. - Heat transport section 
simplified schematic. 
As previously noted, the suit loop is cooled by a backup 
Water Management Section 
The WMS is schematically illustrated in figure 4. The L M  water is stored in one 
large descent tank (332-pound capacity) and two ascent tanks (42-pound capacity each). 
Each tank has a bladder pressurized with nitrogen (N2) to expel the water in zero grav- 
ity and to force the water upward from the descent stage in one-sixth gravity during the 
lunar stay. Series-redundant water pressure regulators provide reduction of the pres- 
sure  to a level compatible with sublimator requirements and permit suit-circuit 
condensate to be effectively pumped by the water separators. A backup set  of series- 
redundant water pressure regulators is provided for  secondary coolant-loop operation. 
The water used for  PLSS refill, for  drinking, for food preparation, and for fire 
extinguishing is tapped off through a dispenser located upstream of the pressure 
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regulators. Water and iodine are mixed 
at the time of LM water loading to give a 
low iodine concentration for bacteria 
control. 
Reclaimed Ascent H@ tanks - 
TECHNICAL H I  STORY 
The technical history is presented 
first for  some general items that apply to 
the system as a whole or for  i tems which 
cut ac ross  several  subsystems. Next, the 
history of subsections is given for the HTS, 
R denotes redundant component. the ARS, the OSCPS, and finally, the WMS. 
No attempt was made to arrange these by Descent Hfl tank 
severity of the problem. All problems 
were significant at the time they were 
reported. 
Figure 4. - Water  management section 
simplified schematic. 
General 
Interstage disconnects. - Interstage disconnects (LSC- 330-505) are used between 
the ascent and descent-stages to provide a flow path for high-pressure oxygen from the 
descent-stage oxygen. tank to the environmental control subsystem in the ascent stage 
and to provide coolant flow paths for the descent-stage cold rails. Normally, service 
fluid lines between spacecraft stages a r e  routed through cutter assemblies if the space- 
craft  stages a r e  required to separate during mission life. At the time of separation, 
the cutter assembly shears  the lines (ensuring safe separation) and allows external 
leakage to occur at the sheared interfaces. Shearing of the glycol lines would have re -  
quired the installation of a shutoff valve (manual o r  electrical) in the supply to the 
descent stage and a check valve in the return line to prevent loss of glycol after separa- 
tion. Because of possible impact ignition, it was a lso considered unsafe to shear the 
oxygen line that contained 900-psia oxygen. The glycol coolant loop is serviced at the 
builder's plant; and, because normal ground checkout required separation of the ascent/ 
descent stages, it was more feasible to use disconnects to eliminate deservicing and 
reservicing of the coolant. Furthermore, the disconnects provide an automatic seal 
to prevent loss of fluid from either half of the disconnect after staging. 
The interstage disconnects were designed without retention mechanisms so they 
could be simply pulled apart. 
descent-stage separation. Coupling of the ascent (structure mounted) disconnect half 
to the descent (structure mounted) disconnect half is maintained by squib bolts, which 
connect the two stages. 
This method ensured minimum resistance to ascent/ 
The original design used a single compression seal and was successfully certified 
with flight bracket assemblies. From the beginning of vehicle assembly and checkout at 
the manufacturer's plant, it was noted that this particular design was susceptible to 
damage during vehicle installation unless extreme care was taken. Subsequent installa- 
tion efforts at the NASA John F. Kennedy Space Center (KSC) verified the damage 
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susceptibility; and it was  necessary to add a redundant seal (fig. 5)  to the LM-3, LM-4, 
LM-5, and LM-6 coolant-loop disconnects to ensure no external leakage. The redun- 
dant seals were not used on the oxygen disconnects because the higher pressure 
(900 psia) provided a much better seal than the lower pressure (20 psia) glycol dis- 
connects. It was also found that the redundant-seal method used was ineffective at 
pressures  above 50 psig. Starting with the LM-7 vehicle, a redesigned disconnect 
(fig. 6), which had built-in redundancy and also provided better protection to the sealing 
surfaces, was used. This design was certified by test and installed in the remaining 
vehicles. To date, this design has shown a high resistance to handling and installation 
damage. 
LSC-330-505-5 redundant seal 
used on coolant loop disconnects 
for LM-3, LM-4. LM-5. and 
LM-6 vehicles 
Figure 5. - Original design of interstage 
disconnect. 
Pr imary poppet seal 
Secondary poppet seal 
Pr imary exter 
leak path seal 
Secondary exterior 
leak path seal 
Figure 6. - Final design of interstage 
disconnect . 
Battery configuration change. - The early LM vehicle design depended on fuel 
cells  for  electrical power generation. 
oxygen) were to be stored in the supercritical state, and it was planned to use the 
cryogens as a heat sink. 
changed to batteries, the hydrogen was  eliminated, and the oxygen storage method was 
changed to high-pressure gas. The ECS requirements and responsibilities were 
changed significantly at this time (approximately March 1965). High-pressure gaseous 
oxygen pressure regulators and relief valves were required, and the high-pressure 
oxygen storage tank in the descent stage became a new ECS responsibility. Previously, 
the ECS oxygen requirements had been supplied from the common cryogenic oxygen 
The reactants for the fuel cells (hydrogen and 
After approximately 2 years  of design work and studies, the power source was 
7 
descent-stage tank. While these changes were being considered and identified, a series 
of studies was performed to  determine the new requirements for  sizing water and 
oxygen consumables. Mission parameters  were updated and varied to examine and to 
understand the vehicle and mission penalties associated with the changes. Implementa- 
tion of the changes produced a large impact upon the ECS. New designs were required 
for a large descent-stage gaseous oxygen tank (approximately 48-pound capacity at 
3000 psi) and two ascent-stage gaseous oxygen tanks (approximately 2. $-pound capacity 
each at 900 psi). New designs were required for  the high-pressure gaseous oxygen 
pressure  regulator and for  the relief valves in the descent stage. Changes to the water 
tank designs were not required. In response to the late start, all of these changes were 
pursued vigorously to shorten the development cycle. 
In contrast to the large impact that the change to batteries had on the ECS, there 
was an early change to incorporate a redundant cooling loop. The redundant-loop 
change affected many hardware i tems but was implemented shortly after the subcon- 
t rac ts  were initiated, and this change was easily accommodated. 
Reliability considerations. - Reliability analyses performed for  each subsystem 
by the contractor resulted in Failure Mode and Effect Analyses and Single Failure Point 
Summary documents. During the course of the contract, these were periodically re -  
fined and improved in detail. The degree of detail was upgraded as more and more 
knowledge of the hardware was gained. These documents served the useful purpose of 
identifying for management those a reas  of subsystem design in which operational r i sks  
would be encountered and also identified the severity of the risk.  For  example, most 
equipment was adequately backed up by redundant components, and failure would result  
in nuisance-type situations rather  than in hazardous conditions. These documents dealt 
with design and operations and were not of the probability assessment type. The cause- 
and-effect type of reliability approach was found by management to be more useful than 
dealing strictly with abstract  numbers of mean time to failure. 
The reliability program also included shelf- life control. Problems were en- 
countered in implementing effective shelf-life control. The original plan by which this 
program was established failed to set  up s t r ic t  controls, such as periodic checking of 
the stored equipment. Based upon observations of shelf-life control, i t  is felt that 
future programs should implement s t r ic t  controls early in the program by providing 
for  periodic testing or periodic operation of equipment, by applying a conscious con- 
sideration of shelf life when evaluating each engineering change (after configuration 
control is established), and by requiring that positive actions a r e  established for  all 
hardware when the shelf-life limitation is reached. 
The failure reporting portion of the reliability program also had some significant 
aspects. Every out-of-specificaticn condition was formally documented from the t ime 
manufacturing of a component was completed. Thus, development problems and in- 
process checks and calibrations were not reported, but all acceptance test  (and sub- 
sequent) problems were reported. A report  was accepted and closed only when a 
comprehensive analysis of the cause was documented and corrective action was ini- 
tiated. The prevailing philosophy of "every failure has a cause" required a compre- 
hensive investigation into the failure causes. Accurate reporting proved helpful many 
times in referring back to a problem. All failure reports  were reviewed by top man- 
agement at the Flight Readiness Review and required closure or a satisfactory explana- 
tion to remove constraints to flight release. A failure report  "explanation" meant that, 
although the failure was not completely closed, there was a satisfactory explanation 
for  a specific spacecraft as a result  of extra testing, isolation of the problem to a spe- 
cific lot, and so forth. 
Flight instrumentation. - The operational instrumentation installed in the ECS 
provided minimum information concerning performance. The vehicle penalties for 
instrumentation were significant, and only data that were considered to be vital were 
provided. The instrumentation requirements were  established early and included a 
number of valve position indicators. 
caused a closed or open circuit to stimulate a telemetry signal, depending upon the 
position of a valve handle. In retrospect, these data have not proven very useful; and 
the weight, power, and volume penalties could have been better allocated to instrumen- 
tation for subsystem performance. The valve position indicators are perhaps useful 
where an inadvertent electrical actuation is possible; but, for manually selected valve 
positions, they are redundant to a voice link for verification of proper subsystem 
configuration. 
These valve position indicators were switches that 
Very small  plunger travel w a s  used to actuate the switches, and this made pre- 
cision alinement necessary. The switch design was also found to be susceptible to 
change in performance (actuation force) with a change in ambient pressure.  Many 
switches were found to have defective internal springs, which changed their 
performance. 
These switches were also difficult to install properly in some valve designs. In 
one application (suit-isolation valves), more than a half dozen indirect measurements 
(with cumulative tolerances) were required for the switch installation because, as a 
result Qf inaccessibility, there was no simple, direct way to measure the installation 
shimming required. 
Several switch applications were deleted from the system where operational ex- 
perience indicated that the function provided could not justify retention of the device. 
In other cases, a change was made to increase the overtravel, giving more positive 
switch action. 
Modular concepts. - Modular packaging concepts were used in several places 
where certain groupings of equipment appeared desirable. 
drawbacks experienced are discussed. 
Some of the advantages and 
The major package in the LM ECS was the suit-circuit assembly (LSC-330-190 
package), which contained the necessary atmosphere processing equipment - such as 
valves, heat exchangers, carbon dioxide removal elements, suit fans, and instrumen- 
tation - for the suit circuit. Interfaces with the electrical power system, with telem- 
etry signals, with the water system, with the coolant system, with the cabin gas, with 
the suit gas umbilical hoses, and with the oxygen supply were  required. A summary of 
components and interfaces for  the ECS packages is given in table I. 
The suit-circuit assembly was densely packaged to accommodate the required 
hardware in the allotted space. U s e  of the modular concept was necessary because of 
the weight and volume constraints, but this led to a number of problems throughout the 
program. Whenever equipment was modified o r  changed, the certification testing 
program was modified accordingly. "Delta" qualification runs, which caused the same 
9 
TABLE I. - COMPONENT MAKEUP OF LM ECS ASSEMBLIES 
Component 
Heat exchanger 
Water separator 
Fan and motor 
Valve 
Pressure regulator 
LiOH canister 
LiOH cartridge 
~~ 
Transducer and switch 
Fluid interface 
connection 
Pump and motor 
Accumulator 
Flow control orifice 
Voltage regulator 
Filter 
Total per assembly 
Environmental control subsystem package, LSC-330- 
190 
kit-circuit 
assembly 
3 
2 
2 
9 
2 
2 
10 
19 
1 
- 
50 
192 
~~ 
Suit 
coolant 
assembly 
1 
1 
1 
4 
1 
1 
2 
1 
12 
290 
Coolant 
recirculation 
assembly 
6 
2 
4 
3 
1 
16 
39 0 
Oxygen 
control 
module 
5 
2 
4 
7 
4 
22 
392 
High-pressure 
oxygen 
control 
assembly 
5 
2 
3 
10 
49 0 
Water 
control 
module 
9 
3 
12 
24 
Total 
4 
2 
3 
35 
7 
2 
2 
16 
49 
4 
1 
3 
1 
5 
134 
basic package to be subjected to a number of different qualification test runs, were 
required in many instances to qualify the revised equipment. The interdependence of 
packaging and functional effects was adequately demonstrated by tests,  but a great num- 
ber of tests and a considerable amount of time were required. 
It had been planned to replace the entire package in the field if any component 
required change for  any reason. Changing an entire package was a fairly lengthy proc- 
ess, and a large number of tests were required to verify that all the components within 
the replacement package were functioning properly after installation. For this reason, 
the practice of changing individual components with the package installed, wherever 
possible, was adopted. This practice, which was successfully performed on a number 
of occasions, saved much time in the vehicle cabin and thus generally avoided schedule 
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slips. Because of the dense packaging, however, removal and replacement of compo- 
nents within an installed package was a difficult task. On each occasion, practice runs 
were made on a bench package at  the subcontractor's plant to establish a suitable pro- 
cedure (to ensure that no damage would be done) and to train the person who was to 
make the change. The exact procedure to be followed in the flight vehicle was developed 
and, in a sense, "qualified" before authorization was given to proceed with replacing 
the flight item. These procedures included the necessary reverification tests. 
Dense packaging caused practical problems that required the expenditure of extra 
time and effort as the penalty for  minimizing cabin volume usage. It is not reasonable 
to assume that complex packages can be installed and never require a component 
change; therefore, it appears that the trade between time and packaging convenience 
must always be carefully weighed and understood. Packaging was  less  complex for 
other areas.  (Coolant pumps, filters, and valves were designated as the LSC-330-290 
package; the cabin oxygen control module, consisting of valves and pressure regulators, 
was called the LSC-330-390 package; water system valves and regulators were desig- 
nated the LSC- 330-490 package; the high-pressure oxygen control module with pressure 
regulators and relief valves was designated the LSC-330-392 package; and the liquid- 
cooling provisions for the crewmen were  designated the LSC-330- 192 package. ) 
Pump packaging was quite successful with no particular complications. The oxy- 
gen and water module packages used complex castings, into which the necessary active 
elements were  fitted. Integral manifolding and the lack of numerous tubes and fittings 
a r e  the main features of the casting approach. This concept worked quite well for the 
oxygen modules. However, for the water system module, a number of design changes 
were  necessary; and the inflexible configuration caused by the casting concept led to 
add-on valves, capped bosses, and similar modifications to achieve minimum-impact 
changes. For the water system module, the use of a casting proved to be an encum- 
brance because the casting design became fixed before the design requirements became 
firm. However, this problem was not experienced with the oxygen modules, and the 
screw-in components were very easily replaced and retested. 
Heat Transpor t  Sect i o n  
Water/glycol formulation. - The coolant fluid caused several problems even though 
the application-was-considered to be well within the state of the ar t .  Initially, the fluid, 
which was formulated to give the following mixture, was specified to be the same as 
that for the command and service module. 
Parts by weight 
. .. 
Material 
Ethylene glycol 62.5 
Distilled water 
Triethanolamine phosphate 1. 6 
As necessary to make 100 parts 
Sodium mercaptobenzothiazole (NaMBT) 0.9 
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By using an identical fluid in both spacecraft, the problems of logistics and of 
ground- support equipment could be minimized. 
During the development of the heat transport components, it was found that addi- 
tional specific heat capacity was required, which necessitated revising the formulation 
to one containing more water and less ethylene glycol. This change improved the spe- 
cific heat from 0.72 to 0.86 Btu/lb"F. 
This change also increased the freezing point f rom approximately -65" to -2"  F, 
but the antifreeze protection was not needed in the LM ECS because the coldest tem- 
peratures encountered are from sublimation of cooling water (in ice  form) to space 
vacuum. The modified LM water/glycol formulation was as follows. 
Material Parts by weight 
Ethylene glycol 35.0 
Distilled water A s  necessary to make 100 par ts  
Triethanolamine phosphate 1. 6 
Sodium mercaptobenzothiazole 0.9 
With the change to the modified coolant, which was made in August 1965, it was 
necessary to adjust the pH of the mixture to a higher value in order to keep the corro- 
sion inhibitors in solution. The appropriate pH was  determined experimentally by the 
spacecraft prime contractor. 
The new coolant was successfully used until June 1969, shortly before the 
Apollo 11 flight, when a precipitate problem was encountered on the LM-5 vehicle. 
During routine fluid sampling fo r  cleanliness and fluid property maintenance, a large 
number of precipitate crystals were found to be present. A number of fluid exchanges 
were made, and special filtering was performed; but the crystals rapidly reformed 
again. In the intensive investigations into the problem, it was found that a relatively 
minor change in a corrosion inhibitor had been made a few months before. A higher 
purity mercaptobenzothiazole (MBT) was introduced instead of the previously used 
commercial grade chemical. The commercial grade fluid produced a hazy solution 
during preparation, which required approximately a week to let the haze form and then 
required filtering to remove it. This slow manufacturing cycle was improved by using 
the higher purity chemical. During the investigation into the crystal  problem, it was 
determined that the commercial inhibitor contained a small  amount of sodium sulfite as 
a stabilizer. Sodium sulfite was added to the LM-5 fluid, but the crystal  formation 
still persisted even after repeated flushes with the modified-purified fluid. The amount 
of sodium sulfite involved was 2 percent (weight) of the NaMBT, which makes up 
0.9 percent (weight) of the finished water/glycol. Thus, a stabilizing agent in the 
amount of 0.018 percent had been omitted. As discovered on the LM-5 vehicle, this 
quantity would not, of itself, inhibit o r  dissolve the crystals.  The crystals were identi- 
fied as the disulfide decomposition product of the NaMBT. Because there was no in- 
dication of any damage to the tubing or other system components caused by corrosion, 
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the main problem seemed to be whether the particles would degrade system flow rates, 
clog the system fil ter or system orifices, or  abrade the pump. Bench testing was con- 
ducted with two different pump-filter packages for endurance; and, although the filter 
plugged both t imes and the automatic relief valve bypassed the filter, the pumps per- 
formed normally. 
crystals were observed to be rather  fragile in character and apparently were readily 
passed through the pumps. No clogging of the flow-balancing orifices occurred during 
bench tests. Gross precipitate was formed in the laboratory, and the fragile nature of 
the precipitate allowed it to pass through the finest orifices used with only a minute 
pressure  head. Based on all these tests, the LM-5 vehicle was flown with the crystals 
present, and no problems were encountered. 
The pumps were dismantled and showed no unusual wear. The 
Subsequent vehicles were drained, flushed thoroughly with water and with isopro- 
pyl alcohol, then refilled with water/glycol formulated with the previously used com- 
mercial  grade inhibitor. This fluid has again proved more'stable and is a satisfactory 
coolant. The investigations showed clearly that subtle amounts of unknown "impurities" 
other than sodium sulfite in the commercial product have a crystal-inhibiting and 
crystal-dissolving action. A contract (NAS 9-9956) was let to continue the investigation 
into determining the nature of these impurities and also to investigate what system ef- 
fects (flow rates ,  etc. ) may cause disulfide crystals to form. 
Sublimator developments. - The development of the sublimators for heat-load 
rejection caused probably-most significant design problems of the LM ECS. 
relative simplicity of sublimator operation might give a misleading impression of the 
difficulties involved in the design and manufacture of the device. Simplicity is apparent 
in the cutaway view (fig. 7) and in the expanded section shown in figure 8. The early 
problems were difficulty in brazing the porous plates and in achieving a good bond with- 
The 
but plugging the pores with braze material. 
techniques. The ear ly  units were also 
showing performance degradation rates 
(with usage time) that were not encourag- 
ing; and, also, the initial performance 
was below expectations. Loss of porosity 
of the plates directly reduces perform- 
ance, and this seemed to be the problem. 
Porous plates with higher permea- 
bility w e r e  used; and several  other im- 
provements in fabrication were tried, 
including welding of fins to the porous 
plates to eliminate brazing problems. 
Performance improvements were made by 
increasing the density of heat-transfer 
fins in  the coolant passages. Additionally, 
to meet performance requirements, it was 
required to control the installation of po- 
rous plates so  that the finer pore orienta- 
tion was always facing the steam vent 
passage. 
Materials were changed-as were brazing 
Cold 
passage)- ' 
Steam 
passage 
Figure 7. - Cutaway view of water 
sublimator. 
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End sheet 
Coolant 
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Evaporant 
Porous plate 
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Porous plate 
Evaporant 
I 
Coolant 
Evaporant 
Porous plate 
Steam passage 
Figure 8. - Expanded section of water 
sublimator . 
Chlorine was added to the stored 
water to act  as a biocide. The chlorinated 
water produced unacceptable performance 
in the sublimators. Formation of a 
chlorine-based residue on the steam- 
passage side of the porous plates caused a 
depression of the freezing point, and water 
breakthrough occurred. Testing was per- 
formed by using iodine as the biocide, and 
these tests showed that iodine was 
acceptable. 
Performance degradation history was 
taken f rom measured data on a Saturn sub- 
limator used for  instrument unit electronics 
cooling. Degradation was found to occur as 
a result of the slow accumulation of corro- 
sion products during storage. Degradation 
during operation was found to be related to 
the cumulative water quantity boiled per 
square foot of surface, and this was caused 
by corrosion and by the slow blockage of 
pores with particulate matter. 
To guarantee specified performance 
a t  the time of a mission, a higher perform- 
ance is required at the time of acceptance 
testing. The magnitude of this performance margin was established by tests and anal- 
yses. The most sensitive parameters were the duration of operation and the quantity of 
water used per square foot of sublimation surface. The sublimator plates and assem- 
blies were stored in a dry nitrogen environment to minimize degradation for as much of 
the manufacturing and checkout process as possible. 
Flight experience with the sublimators has been very satisfactory on LM flights 
to date. Performance has been very stable and has followed preflight predictions. 
Quick disconnects. - Quick disconnects were used in the heat transport section for 
convenience in making and breaking several connections. Several problems that were 
caused by loss of the lubricant within the connectors occurred. 
Whenever a draining operation was required, isopropyl alcohol was used following 
draining to flush the residual water/glycol from the system. Removal of the lubricant 
by the alcohol prevented free action of the moving parts and thereby caused incomplete 
sealing. Leakage resulted when these units were subjected to gaseous leakage checks, 
although it was felt that the liquid coolant would not leak because of the lubricity prop- 
erties of the liquid. However, in practice, any unit showing gaseous leakage was re- 
moved and replaced to guarantee a leak-free system. To prevent replacement time, 
the ground-support equipment interface quick disconnects were redesigned to allow 
reapplication of lubricant following alcohol exposure. 
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It was a lso found that the plasticizer in Buna-N elastomers used in the quick dis- 
connects was  shrunk by the isopropyl alcohol after a certain period of alcohol exposure 
as determined by testing. 
the cri t ical  exposure times. 
The alcohol flush times were controlled to values less than 
Accumulator designs. - A water/glycol accumulator that would maintain acceptable 
leakage at the flanges proved difficult to build. An accumulator unit is illustrated in 
cutaway view in figure 9. The diaphragm forms the sealing gasket, and slight irregu- 
larities in the molded diaphragm result  in 
uneven and inadequate sealing forces. The 
size of the flange groove was reduced to 
achieve the proper bead squeeze. The 
metal shoulder on the flange had to be re- 
phragm squeeze. The use of higher 
torquing of the screws on the retaining 
ring around the flange was also imple- 
mented. The screws had to be added be- 
cause high torquing of the retaining ring * 
itself created relative displacement of the 
top and bottom shells, which tended to 
wrinkle the diaphragm. After the screws 
were added, leakage problems seemed to 
be well  in hand. 
designed to control the amount of dia- el r i n g  
Fluid 
PO rt 
Approximately a year later, a large 
crack was discovered at the angle section Note shown 
of a retaining ring. Investigation into this 
problem revealed that the material (alu- 
stresses above those allowed for  stress- 
corrosion control. All accumulators 
were recalled, the ring material  was  changed to aluminum alloy 7075T7351, and the 
c ross  section was thickened in the affected area to reduce s t r e s s  levels. 
Figure 9. - Coolant accumulator (item 
minum alloy 2024T4) was subjected to LSC- 3 30- 2 10). 
It is important to note that the stress-corrosion problem was brought on by the 
solution of a totally unrelated problem. Higher and higher s t r e s ses  were  imposed on 
the unit by incrementally increasing the squeeze on the diaphragm bead for sealing 
purposes. Problems with stress corrosion were common in a number of subsystems 
in the LM. In this case, the material  in all of the glycol accumulator retaining rings 
was  greatly overstressed; however, only one unit failed. It appears that stress corro- 
sion may or may not occur even when the s t r e s ses  are well above the "threshold" 
values. However, the uncertainty associated with s t r e s s  corrosion is such that ad- 
herence to threshold s t r e s s  levels is the only safe approach. 
Sublimator breakthrough ~ _ _  problems. - The initial redundant cooling loop contained 
no water/glycol accumulator. An "accumulator effect" was designed into the system 
by an interface with the water system. This design required that the secondary coolant 
loop be maintained at a subatmospheric pressure to accommodate expected thermal 
expansions and contractions and to provide a pressure compatible with the water sys- 
tem in case the secondary cooling system were activated. 
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Figure 10 il lustrates the general arrangement of the redundant cooling system 
and the water system. The interface of these two systems is at the puncture disk, and 
activation of the secondary cooling loop included puncturing of this disk so that the water 
system could serve  as an accumulator. The use of ganged valves ensured that the 
selection of the proper water valves drove a pointed plunger through the puncture disk. 
Because this was an i r reversible  step that left the systems with some intermixed fluid 
and required special cleaning, the actuating mechanism was  arranged to prevent in- 
advertent puncturing of the disk. Despite this design and the use  of warning flags dur- 
ing ground operations, there were several  instances early in the program when the 
disk was punctured during factory operations. 
Puncture 
disk Plunger 
Secondary 
sublimator 
Water 
supply 
48 psia l f u l l l  
12 psia lempty) 
6 psia Water pressure 
regulation coolant-loop 
Secondary 
suit-circuit  
Water sublimator 
Check + 
, cwlant-loop Condensed water 
/ 
Overboard 
/ 
Overboard 
I' Overboard 
I \  sublimator 
Figure 10. - Simplified diagram of original design of redundant cooling 
loop/water system. 
This configuration was sensitive to the absolute pressure in the water/glycol 
loop. A high pressure caused water/glycol to enter the waterline feeding the secondary 
sublimators. Development testing indicated that the sublimators had an acceptable 
tolerance to the ethylene glycol (commonly used as "permanent" antifreeze). The 
pressure in the secondary water/glycol system was established by filling it with hot, 
deaerated water/glycol and then sealing it off. When the system cooled to ambient 
temperatures, it was at a subatmospheric pressure (approximately 5 psia). 
Thermal-vacuum testing on a lunar module test article (LTA- 8) provided the 
first opportunity for testing with complete spacecraft systems. A very slight leak 
existed, and the pressure that was locked off in the secondary coolant loop slowly rose. 
During the "hot case" secondary loop operation, the disk was  punctured and the sec- 
ondary sublimators failed. The glycol had caused sufficient lowering of the freezing 
point of the sublimator feedwater to prevent an ice layer f rom forming, allowing the 
water to break through and to f reeze in the steam duct. To eliminate this interface 
16 
between the water system and the secondary water/glycol loop, the design was changed 
by adding an accumulator. The puncture disk and waterline were removed, and plugs 
and caps were installed to isolate the systems. 
Pump noise. - The coolant pumps, which are located in the cabin, have produced 
high noise levels. Surveys have shown that the pumps are not noisy in themselves, but 
the vanes produce pulses of fluid flow which excite the coolant lines and (sometimes) the 
cabin structural  panels to which the tubes are attached. The coolant is carefully deaer- 
ated to prevent the formation of gas bubbles, which could cause cavitation or flow block- 
age. This removal of gas lowers the bulk modulus, which aggravates the noise 
problem. Several methods of quieting the pumping noise were investigated and evalu- 
ated. A n  expansion device that produced a significant reduction in noise was included 
downstream of the pump on later vehicles. 
The noise experienced on missions was somewhat distracting, both because of the 
intensity and because of an apparent change in frequency on occasion. This frequency 
changing has not been completely understood, but it is felt that reducing the overall 
noise level will make any such occurrences less noticeable. 
The pulsing of flow can be detected by slight, periodic pressure changes of ap- 
proximately 10 psi. The mechanical stresses caused by these pulses within the system 
components were determined to be insignificant. Because these fluctuations at  
400 hertz produced "noisy" data, the pump discharge pressure transducer was elec- 
trically damped. The pressure ripple at  400 hertz results from the 6000 rpm of the 
four-vaned pump. 
Atmosphere Revital izat ion Section 
Liquid-cooled-garment provisions. - A crew complaint in December 1968 indi- 
cated thZ theM-4  suit cool -azrg ina l  during the altitude-chamber run at KSC. 
Design and checkout data reviews showed that the LM-4 suit cooling portion of the ECS 
was  performing somewhat better than specification, and the suits themselves were 
found to be within specification. 
improvements were  investigated to see  if the gas cooling could be extended. 
cooling capacity is 520 Btu/man-hour for steady -state operation. 
only minor improvements could be realized with the gas cooling approach. A system 
design change was  made quickly to provide chilled water from the LM for  circulation 
through the liquid-cooled garments. This method of cooling provides a large increment 
of cooling capacity. Even with the worst-case (warm water) situation, a 1200-Btu/man- 
hour metabolic load can be comfortably handled; and 2000-Btu/man-hour loads can be 
accomm'odated for at least short  periods, although heavier perspiration is experienced. 
Several methods of providing cooling performance 
The design 
It w a s  concluded that 
The design that was adopted for  liquid cooling was not optimized; instead, maxi- 
mum usage was made of existing components to make the unit available for  LM-5, the 
first lunar landing vehicle (Apollo 11). The cabin heat exchanger was removed not only 
to provide a location for  the new unit (designated the LSC-330-192 package) in the . 
cabin, but also because the cabin temperature control range provided by the cabin heat 
exchanger was a rather small  value. This follows the trend of both Gemini spacecraft 
and the Apollo command module ECS experience, in which the cabin temperature con- 
t ro l  provisions have been quite smal l  compared to the capacity of suit-circuit heat 
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exchangers. Typically, after the design has proceeded as far as vehicle thermal- 
vacuum testing and flight, there has been enough confidence to delete o r  to deactivate 
the cabin heat exchangers. The design selected also removed the cabin temperature 
control valve and one cabin fan. The remaining cabin fan was retained for contingency 
purposes to enable cabin atmosphere mixing and purging necessitated by the loss of 
carbon dioxide removal capability. The liquid-to- liquid heat exchanger that was as- 
sociated with the cabin heat exchanger was relocated and replumbed to chill the water 
with cold water/glycol. As a sidelight to the deletion of the cabin heat exchanger, the 
cabin temperature sensor was  no longer located in any gas s t ream and thus sensed a 
temperature in a remote corner of the cabin. It had been observed that a waterline 
temperature closely approximated the cabin temperature (because the water is routed 
through the cabin, giving a considerable dwell time); therefore, the water temperature 
was used as cabin temperature by flight controllers. This procedure saved relocating 
the sensor to a location which would receive good airflow of representative cabin-gas 
temperature. 
The water pump used in the LSC-330-192 unit is a PLSS design and uses  16 volts 
dc. A voltage regulator was designed to drop the LM 28-volt dc power to the correct 
voltage. This voltage regulator was the only new item designed for  the LSC-330-192 
package. A glycol valve was modified to bypass the circulating water around the 
liquid-to-liquid heat exchanger for  crew comfort. This design provides water at the 
same temperature for both crewmen; and, if one is overchilled, he can disconnect the 
water umbilical at the suit. A schematic diagram of this unit is shown in figure 11. 
Cabin fan Orifice 
Accumulator 
Orifice 
Key: 
LhIP - lunar  module pilot 
CDR - commander 
Coolant from 
low-temperatu re 
electronics 
Coolant to 
high-temperature 
cold rai ls 
I 
I 
regulator 
I 
Figure 11. - Schematic diagram of the LSC-330-192 package. 
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Water  separators.  - The water separators underwent several  changes to achieve 
specified performance. Considerable early development testing was performed to re- 
duce the gas-side pressure drop and still achieve water pumping capability. Later, the 
assembly was redesigned to improve the pitot tube (water pump) efficiency, the bearing 
supports, and the assembly method. In later stages of development, several  of the gas 
inlet vanes were blocked to give the gas s t ream impinging on the turbine blades of the 
rotating drum a higher velocity. In addition, the blade angle was changed, and the 
water pitot probe was again modified. Wi re  mesh was added to the drum to assist the 
coalescing of the droplets. A cutaway view of the flight configuration is shown in 
figure 12: 
All the development changes were 
Pitot (water pump) 
aimed at improving the pumping capabil- 
ity with low gas-flow rates. During qual- 
ification testing, the unit experienced a 
failure to start following a shutdown. In 
this condition, the ullage water that is 
retained within the unit sett les to the 
bottom and creates  a high resistance to 
rotation when restart is attempted with a 
low gas-flow rate at minimum system 
pressure.  Clearances were revised, 
drain provisions were added, and addi- 
tional inlet guide vanes were blocked. 
This design was then qualified by test for 
flight. 
moisture 
Figure 12. - Centrifugal water separator 
(item LSC- 330- 109). During the flight of Apollo 11, 
waterdrops were sprayed onto the crew- 
men on several  occasions. 
reasons, but the cause was  finally determined to be water separator overspeed. 
gas-flow was considerably in excess of specification as a result  of better-than- 
specification performance of the suit fans 
and because of lower-than-nominal system- 
pressure drops. At high speeds, the water 
in the trough splashes; and some is car-  
r ied downstream and into the suits. A 
simple orifice plate was added to the pri- 
mary lithium hydroxide cartridge to re- 
turn the gas-pressure drop to specification 
value in order to provide necessary water 
removal efficiency. Because the secondary 
lithium hydroxide cartridge is smaller 
than the primary cartridge and produces 
a pressure drop compatible with proper 
water separator performance, this snap- 
in item, which is illustrated in figure 13, 
was  not required for  the secondary 
cartridge. 
The subsequent investigations identified several  possible 
The 
Figure 13. - Primary LiOH cartridge 
(item LSC-330-122). 
19 
I 
Suit-isolation valves. - During the safety reassessments following the Apollo 
spacecraft fire in 1967, a completely new valve was developed and provided for isolation 
of the suit gas umbilical hoses. The change provided electrically actuated, fast-acting 
valves that automatically closed both supply and return hoses of both crewmen if suit- 
circuit pressure dropped below a safe level. Use  of the valve guaranteed that a t  least 
one crewman would be protected (pressurized) and enabled to reopen his hoses manu- 
ally, to close the hatch (which was presumably open in order to  get a low cabin pressure 
in the first place), and to repressurize the cabin. The previous design was manually 
actuated only and provided protection for  one less failure than the solenoid actuated 
design. This change was made rather late in the program and proceeded without major 
problems. Sluggish operation on several  units required a minor change of materials 
to retain clearances after repeated usage. 
A cutaway view of this valve is shown 
in figure 14. The cabin repressurization 
valve could be automatically actuated by 
means of the switch shown on the cutaway 
only if the repressurization valve was in 
the automatic mode. This switch was later 
removed as an unnecessary function. 
Actuation of the suit-isolation valves 
was initially achieved by a suit-pressure 
transducer, which activated relays through 
signals from the caution and warning sub- 
system. This design was changed to acti- 
vate the relays directly f rom a snap-acting 
pressure switch. This change improved 
the reliability and simplified the overall 
design. Originally, the transducer signal 
was compared with a preset voltage level 
in the caution and warning subsystem, 
which triggered the relay that applied the 
voltage to the isolation valves when the 
suit-circuit pressure decreased below the 
present level. 
for "disconnect" mode 
Figure 14. - Suit-isolation valve 
(item LSC-330- 138). 
Carbon dioxide sensor. - A number of 
problems were encountered with the carbon 
dixoide sensor used in the LM ECS, and the unit was frequently criticized. Despite the 
criticisms, the flight performance was generally good and provided useful data. The 
functional schematic diagram of the carbon dioxide sensor is shown in figure 15. 
This instrument was initially Government-furnished equipment and was later 
turned over to the contractor to be supplied as contractor-furnished equipment. When 
the unit was retested to prove compatibility with the LM vibration levels, vibration 
problems were encountered. Other sensitivities were detected in the course of further 
ground testing, and design changes made are discussed in the following paragraphs. 
The unit was mounted on vibration isolators to help attenuate the vibration envi- 
ronment. In addition, a more rugged infrared (IR) source (lamp) was used; and the unit 
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Figure 15. - Simplified system diagram 
of a C 0 2  sensor. 
case was ruggedized. The unit was de- 
signed to have a dc ground; but, because 
this was incompatible with the LM caution 
and warning system, an ac  ground 
(resistance-capacitance network) was  
added to delete electromagnetic interfer- 
ence (EMI) sensitivity. 
If water entered the unit, it could 
bridge a narrow gap and set up a galvanic 
corrosion cell, which would then degrade 
the optical filter layers and seriously de- 
grade the sensitivity of the unit. An epoxy- 
type coating was added to cover the metal 
surface near the filter and thus eliminate 
the galvanic cell action. 
Calibration changes with time and 
temperature were traced to outgassing of 
the conformal coating in the electronics 
section. Because the outgas products 
absorbed IR energy at the same wavelength 
(4.3 microns) that carbon dioxide does, elimination of the resultant distorted signals 
required a change to the conformal coating material. 
thermistor were added to the circuitry for temperature compensation. 
In addition, a t r im resis tor  and a 
Flight performance indicated satisfactory operation except for several  momentary 
excursions during engine firings and several  instances when water is believed to have 
been introduced into the sensor.  Solids or liquids which interrupt the optical signal 
appear as large amounts of carbon dioxide and distort the signal. The unit will return 
to normal operation after the water  dries.  
Lithium hydroxide. - Cartridges containing lithium hydroxide a r e  located in the 
suit-circuit assembly to provide chemical control of carbon dioxide. During the pro- 
gram, several  significant design changes were made. 
The early design allowed the granular lithium hydroxide to abrade when the unit 
was  subjected to vibration, and "dust" that was generated and evolved with the effluent 
gas was  very caustic and irri tating to eyes, nose, and throat t issues.  The design was 
changed in early 1966 by compressing the granules tighter within the container so that 
relative motion was inhibited. The packing procedure was also changed to load only a 
fraction of the cartridge, then vibrate lightly to pack the granules, load some more, 
vibrate, and s o  forth until the unit was properly filled. Figure 13 shows the flight con- 
figuration in cutaway view, 
Polyurethane foam was the material  that was used to compress the granules. 
This material, which was selected to give uniformly high loading, was durable even 
under required storage vacuum and temperature conditions. Following the Apollo 
spacecraft fire in January 1967, the use of polyurethane foam for compressing lithiurn 
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hydroxide granules was prohibited. Although fire testing of this design was success- 
fully passed, the presence of the polyurethane foam represented an immeasurable 
hazard, which was judged to be undesirable. 
The ensuing redesign considered other "foam rubber" materials of the fireproof 
c lass  (Fluorel foams) along with metallic springs and washers to achieve the chemical 
bed compression loading. Because the fireproof foams were not too well developed at 
that time, the metallic spring design was adopted and qualified for use. The filter 
material contained in the cartridge was changed from Dacron to Teflon felt at the same 
time. 
During the Apollo 10 (LM-4) flight, an unusually high rate of carbon dioxide in- 
crease,  followed by a decrease, was noted. (See the section entitled ??Flight Experi- 
ence. ") The LM-4 LiOH cartridge, which was returned in the Apollo command module 
for  analysis by the manufacturer, became the first item of LM equipment to be re- 
turned for postflight analysis. Following chemical and X-ray diffraction analyses, it 
was finally concluded that variations in the 
chemical conversion rates combined with 
carbon dioxide sensor tolerances accounted 
for  the flight performance variations. No 4.4 - 
evidence of channeling o r  breakthrough 
4.0 
3.6 
- 
deemed necessary. Figure 16 shows the - 
was found, and no design changes were 
flight data combined with test data from 
ground-test cartridges. It can be seen 
that performance variations that reflect 
widely varying rates  of increase had been 
experienced. Subsequent flight perform- 
ance predictions were made for  optimistic 
and pessimistic variations to account for 
the dispersions seen in test. The peaks 6 
seen at 6 and 7 . 7  hours were typical of 
closed suit-loop operation and were caused 
by a combination of reduced suit-loop mass 
flow and an increase in carbon dioxide 
partial  pressure.  Future designs should 
: 2.0 - 
E 1.6 
Predicted for A p l l o  10 
1520 Btu iman-hour1 
1 1 1 1  
.8 
attempt to maintain system pressure and 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 
flow during suited and unsuited operations. Relative time, hr  
Suit-circuit fans. - The suit fan Figure 16. - Lithium hydroxide cartridge 
performance curves. motors were initially manufactured by a 
vendor to the main subcontractor. Prob- 
lems were experienced both in failures 
of the power transistors and in consistently getting the corrdct rotational direction as 
a result  of improper phasing of the integral inverters.  This development was eventually 
taken over by the main subcontractor, and design changes were established to correct 
the problems. 
Bearing problems were  caused by (1) contamination, which required improved 
cleaning; (2) inadequate lubrication, which necessitated changing from G- 308 to 
Andok-C grease; and (3) bearing race brinelling, which required an improved fixture 
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to pull bearings. 
corrected by revised techniques and by design changes. The fan wheel rubbed during 
early testing, and clearances were changed slightly. Shimming was used to prevent the 
inducing of loads into the fan scrol l  from the ductwork. 
Particulate contamination during the manufacturing operation was 
In late 1968, an EM1 suppression filter within a suit fan electronics package was 
found to have an intermittent open circuit during KSC checkout. 
traced to overheating of the EM1 filters 
when heavy electric leads were  soldered 
on. The overheating caused failure of a 
change to heavy-gage wire was made as 
the spacecraft 204 accident at KSC in 1967. 
The configuration of the radial  flow fan- 
motor assembly is shown in figure 17 and 
a motor cutaway view in figure 18. De- 
tails of the EM1 filter configuration and 
wiring arrangement are shown in figure 19. 
The problem was 
solder joint within a capacitor. The Fan discharge duct 
a result  of wiring safety reviews following brushless motor 
Gas flow 
c 
It was desired to tes t  the units in 
place within the vehicle to save time. A 
bench test program was set up in an effort 
to determine whether the capacitor lead 
would be intermittently open, but the tests 
were unsuccessful. The tests used X-ray, 
r f  energy, and an "rf sniffer." The 
X-ray approach was unsuccessful because 
the problem joint was too inaccessible in 
the installation. Imposing r f  energy on 
the power leads proved to be only partially 
ently generate enough rapid local heating 
to cause a capacitor open circuit. These 
bench tes ts  were tried on units which had 
been intentionally failed as well  as on 
some good units. 
would detect radiated electromagnetic 
noise, could not consistently detect a prob- 
lem in intentionally failed units because of 
poor accessibility of the probe. 
Figure 17. - Suit fan-motor assembly. 
successful because it would not consist- €MI filter location 
The rf sniffer, which 
$ 
I 
The design solution for the filter 
t problem was  to move the heavy-wire con- 
nection point far ther  from the capacitor 
lead and to install a wiring lug that was 
better suited to the heavy wire.  A method 
was  developed to'remove the suit fans 
(two per  vehicle) f rom the vehicle instal- 
lation and to replace them with redesigned 
Figure 18. - Cutaway view of suit fan 
motor. 
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units. This procedure proved to be suc- 
cessful when done by one specific, metic- 
ulous assembly technician. The potentially 
faulty fans were replaced on the LM-3 
(Apollo 9) vehicle at KSC, thus saving 
many days of replacement and checkout 
time that would have been required for 
replacement of a complete ARS package. 
The highly skilled technician was presented 
a "Snoopy" award for his effort. The 
exact method and the technique required to 
perform these replacements were practiced 
and perfected at the subcontractor's plant 
before they were  performed on the flight 
vehicle. 
Oxygen Supply and Cabin Pressur iza t ion  
Filter housing 
Capacitor Sect ion 
used to repressurize the cabin and can be 
actuated manually or automatically by a 
solenoid in response to low cabin pressure. 
During design feasibility testing, the 
manual-close seat was found to be sus- 
ceptible to permanent setting, and the seat 
material was changed from Viton B to 
Terminal l u g  
Screen 
No 22-gage wi re 
Ferri te beads 
Viton VB90. The configuration is illus- 
trated in figure 20 and is designated con- 
figuration A (fig. 21(a)). 
Figure 19. - Suit fan EM1 filter 
configuration. 
During production acceptance testing 
prior to the endurance phase of qualifica- 
close mode. Inspection revealed that the 
seat had cracked as a result of compres- 
sive loads. The seat was redesigned to a 
wave-type shape (configuration B, fig. 21(b)) 
to allow required compression with lateral 
material expansion. This configuration 
was subjected to verification tests followed 
by formal certification tests. During the 
vibration-temperature testing of the certi- 
fication program, the valve again leaked 
in the manual-close mode. It was deter- 
mined that tolerance buildup was allowing 
the valve poppet to load unevenly and to 
emergency oxygen valve. move laterally during vibration. A design 
ally c l 0 S ~  tion, leakage again occurred in the manual- 
pressure 
switch 
Note Valve shown in "auto" position. 
Figure 20. - Cabin repressurization and 
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change was made to the seat length to provide better centering and to resist lateral 
movement. Certification testing was completed with no additional leakage problems. 
Configuration C (fig. 21(c)) is the final seat and seal design. 
Seat 
Seal W o n  VBWI 
Shim 
4r 
.-  
"i -
3 
c 
Yoke 
(a) Configuration A. 
(c) Configuration C . 
Figure 21. - Seat and seal details - 
cabin repressurization and 
emergency oxygen valve. 
Seal IVi ton VB90) 
al c 
L 
c 
.-  
m u
(b) Configuration B. 
The cabin repressurization and 
emergency oxygen valve, a high flow-rate 
device, is located in the cabin immediately 
behind the lunar module pilot. When the 
valve position is changed from "close" to 
"auto** or f rom "auto" to "close, *' a 
sharp, loud report  occurs. This ',bang'* 
is caused by high-pressure gas expanding 
to produce a shock wave. Testing of the 
valve demonstrated adequately that no 
equipment damage is incurred; but the 
noise has been startling to the crew, par- 
ticularly when their helmets are off. 
Several design modifications were consid- 
ered, but no changes were directed. The 
very satisfactory functioning of the existing 
design was felt to be a distinct asse t  and 
the flight crew recommended retaining 
the design and providing proper alerting 
of the crews. This has become an emected 
noise during activation/deactivation of the LM subsystems and during extravehicular 
activity (EVA) preparations. 
Demand regulators. - The oxygen demand regulator (LSC-330-306) is one of two 
parallel-redundant units that are used to provide suit-loop and cabin pressure control. 
The regulator (fig. 22) is basically a balanced rocker/poppet design with calibrated 
springs working against an aneroid bellows for absolute pressure control. A failed- 
open regulator is overridden by the closure of a redundant manual seat. The aneroid 
chamber is isolated from the regulated pressure chamber, and each chamber is con- 
nected to the suit loop by a separate line. 
25 
Selector 
Valve position ha d'e 
Funct ion  switch 
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Aneroid bellows 
gen s u it -c i r c  u it 
Poppet 
supply assembly 
Figure 22. - Cutaway view of oxygen demand regulator. 
The original design was highly sensitive to vibration while the demand regulator 
was operating within i ts  pressure-control regions. Various aneroids and mass- 
balancing techniques were employed before the design was acceptable. The final de- 
sign did not complet'ely eliminate the increased leakage during vibration, but the 
suit-loop oxygen volumes a r e  such that negligible pressure rise would occur during 
the vibration periods. 
On several  occasions, the oxygen demand regulators were contaminated by water, 
which produced corrosion following system checkout problems at the factory. These 
problems, which were always associated with testing the suit circuit "wet" by using 
the metabolic simulator (which introduces steam into the ECS), were identified only 
after some length of time following the incidents. In some cases, excessive water has 
been introduced as a result of metabolic simulator problems or by test e r r o r s  with 
other related ground-test equipment that blocked the water discharge from the separa- 
tors.  The result was that water collects at the low point in the system where the oxygen 
regulator discharge tube attaches to the suit circuit. Testing is performed at 5 psia; 
and, at the completion of testing, water is driven upward into the demand regulators 
when the pressure is returned to sea level. Subsequent drying operations (evacuation 
and purge) were ineffective in removing the water f rom the regulators; and corrosion 
resulted, particularly on the aneroid bellows. The relationship between the water 
separator a rea  of the suit circuit and the oxygen demand regulators is shown in fig- 
u r e  23. 
all factory operations to avoid moisture problems. 
4 
t 
The use of steam in the metabolic simulator was finally discontinued during 
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Figure 23. - Elevation schematic of 
demand regulator/suit circuit. 
External 
handle 
Figure 24. - Cabin dump and relief valve 
(item LSC-330- 307). 
Cabin dump and relief valve. - Two 
(redundant) cabin dump and relief valves 
(LSC-330-307) are used in each LM vehicle 
Each valve provides cabin pressure relief 
at 5. 6 -f 0.2 psid and is sized to prevent 
overpressurization of the cabin f rom any 
single failure of high-pressure oxygen 
lines or components. Manual actuations 
are provided to  allow depressurization of 
the cabin when desired and also to close 
off the main poppet if the servo control 
fails open. A section view of the valve 
is shown in figure 24. The cabin dump 
and relief valve has three modes of opera- 
tion, as follows. 
1. The ''dump" mode mechanically 
lifts the main poppet, allowing manually 
controlled cabin depressurization. 
2. The "auto" mode allows the 
servo valve (which is referenced to cabin 
and external environments) to control 
pressure by equalizing the servo chamber 
pressure with external pressure,  allowing 
cabin pressure to  force the main poppet 
open. 
su re  is reached, the servo valve closes; 
and the servo chamber is returned to 
cabin pressure by pressure inbleed through 
the cabin reference orifice that causes the 
main poppet to close. 
Once the servo valve reseat pres- 
3. The "close" mode is provided to 
allow manual closure of the main poppet if 
the servo fails open. 
f o r  this failure is limited to 1 lb/hr by 
the cabin reference orifice. 
Overboard leakage 
During initial certification testing of 
8 the cabin dump and relief valve, the leak- 
age ra tes  were out of specification following vibration-temperature exposure. 
down indicated that a material used as a volume filler in the servo chamber was 
venting full closure of the servo valve. 
ing development tests to  achieve the proper dynamic responses of the valve, w a s  
changed from an expanded molded foam (like Styrofoam) to  gaskets formed f rom a 
silicone rubber compound. 
changes. 
Tear- 
t cracking and generating particle contamination that lodged in the servo valve seat,  pre- 
The filler material, which was necessary dur- 
Certification was completed with no additional design 
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High-pressure regulation and relief. - The high-pressure oxygen control module 
(designated LSC--330-39'2) in the descent stage used a combination of three modes of 
pressure  relief. Redundant bypass relief valves provided low-rate relief to the section 
downstream of the pressure regulators. 
provided pressure relief, if necessary, during translunar coast. 
board relief valves were se t  to operate at  a pressure higher than the pressure at which 
the bypass relief valves operate. 
the highest relief pressure.  
quired to function during a mission. 
Redundant low-rate overboard relief valves 
The low-rate over- 
A reseating burst  disk provided high-rate relief at 
By design, none of these relief valves should ever be re- 
One of the most significant features of this module was the incorporation of the 
reseating burst  disk, which was an early design change that allowed retention of enough 
oxygen to provide one cabin repressurization following a burst-disk rupture. 
seating burst  disk provided a significant degree of safety for the crew if a burst  disk 
ruptured during a lunar EVA period. 
mode (fig. 25(a)) and in a flow mode with the disk ruptured (fig. 25(b)). 
washers would reseat  the disk-support poppet when the upstream pressure  was reduced. 
The re- 
This assembly is shown in the normal sealed 
The Belleville 
Disk-support 
poppet 
- Burst disk  
t ; - J r w  
I n le t  
(a) Normal sealed position. 
Figure 25. - Burst-disk relief assembly. 
Water Management Section 
Bel lev i l le  
I n le t  
(b) Open position. 
Iodine compatibility. - All the water used in the LM is loaded before launch, and 
medical requirements exist for  maintaining the water f r ee  of viable organisms for 
health reasons. 
the potable (drinking and food preparation) water and the reclaimed (from respiration 
and perspiration) metabolic water. 
likely that a biocide would be required even if there were no interconnection because of 
uncertainties in long- te rm water storage and the necessity of maintaining an acceptable 
microbiological condition. ) 
This requirement evolved because there is an interconnection between 
(Notwithstanding the foregoing, it is considered 
Tests at the main subcontractor facility showed that the sublimators could not 
perform using chlorine (introduced as sodium hypochlorite). In a hard vacuum, a 
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greenish residue (identified as chlorine hydrate) slowly formed on the ice layer. After 
a period of time, the increased concentration of the chlorine hydrate lowered the melt- 
ing point of the ice below 32" F. 
through the porous plates and to  freeze in the vacuum space. 
This melted the ice and caused water to run freely 
Iodine was next t r ied as a biocide and found to be compatible with the sublimation 
process. Development testing of other portions of the water system and with metallic 
and nonmetallic materials showed generally good stability and only slight corrosion 
from the use of iodine. Corrosion which results with iodine concentrations of about 
15 ppm is essentially the same as that which occurs with water alone. 
Tests were performed to  show that a proper iodine concentration could be main- 
tained for  approximately 30 days. The medical requirement was that at least a 0. 5-ppm 
iodine residual had to be present when the last water was consumed, which could be ap- 
proximately 30 days after tank servicing. No onboard test  devices were planned be- 
cause of the rather cumbersome checking techniques required of the crew. Further 
ground-test resul ts  began to  show wide variations in iodine depletion rates .  The vari- 
ables involved seemed to  be inseparable, and the data were reviewed carefully several 
t imes before a pattern apparently emerged. The final conclusion was that the initial 
exposure of the water tanks to iodine resulted in an acceptably slow depletion rate ,  but 
that repeated exposures caused progres- 
sively faster depletion rates .  
rective measure was to avoid loading 
flight load. The descent water tank con- 
figuration is illustrated in figure 26. The Diffuser tube 
ascent tank is similar but is more spher- 
ical  in shape. 
The cor- 
water containing iodine except for  the N2 1111 part 
N2 cavity 
The mechanism of iodine depletion 
was found to  be the diffusion of iodine va- 
por from the water, through the silicone 
rubber bladder, and into the surrounding 
nitrogen gas space. Water vapor also 
permeates the bladder, as does the nitro- 
gen pressurant gas. The humid iodine 
vapor attacks the anodized aluminum tank 
wall; and, as the anodized coating is 
corroded, more 6061-T6 aluminum is ex- 
posed. The exposed aluminum readily 
reacts with the iodine. As the iodine is 
depleted, the vapor pressure is reduced 
and more iodine vapor permeates the 
bladder to maintain an equilibrium vapor 
pressure,  thus depleting the iodine in the 
water. The anodized aluminum standpipe 
that is immersed in the liquid s ide is con- 
sistently uncorroded, but the tank walls 
show definite corrosion with the amount 
dependent upon exposure time. 
\ 
v 
Mounting plate 
Water f i l l  and out let  port 
(item LSC- 330-404). 
Figure 26. - Descent water tank 
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Exposure history was not readily apparent as the cause of iodine depletion, be- 
cause of the many variables of testing. Tank shells and tank bladders were often shifted 
f rom test to test (because not many test i tems were available for  use) and reexposed. 
Exposure times and concentrations of iodine varied considerably. It was felt for  a time 
that the bladder material  reacted with the iodine, and "seasoning" of bladders was tr ied 
at several  hundred ppm. Bladders which had been exposed to ethyl alcohol appeared for 
a t ime to cause fast iodine depletion. Until that time, the iodine was introduced in tinc- 
ture  form (iodine in ethyl alcohol) because the ease of dissolving iodine in alcohol made 
the testing more convenient. Testing was changed to  use  water solutions of iodine only. 
Only after the tank shell  exposure histories were carefully arranged in order did the 
depletion test  results appear consistent. 
The water tanks on the LM-3 (Apollo 9) vehicle had been exposed to iodine in the 
altitude-chamber testing a t  KSC; thus, early depletion of the iodine was predicted. A 
bacteria fi l ter  was affixed to the water dispenser for  that flight. The fi l ter  was not used 
on the LM-4 vehicle because the water tanks were not exposed to iodine before the flight 
water was loaded. 
Tank bladder adhesions. - Silicone rubber bladders were used in the water tanks 
for  zero-gravity expulsion. It was found that a bladder, when maintained in a collapsed 
state for  a considerable period, would adhere to itself (adjacent folds, for  example); 
and, when subsequently expanded, i t  would be weakened o r  damaged. This adhesion was 
of the nature of a fusion of the rubber. 
sequently maintained in an expanded s ta te  by the application of several  psi  of dry nitro- 
gen pressure on the waterside. Whenever the bladder configuration was changed 
(inflations or deflations), a record was entered in a "Limited Life Log" in accordance 
with established program requirements. Pressure  cycles on the tank itself were like- 
wise recorded for a comparison to allowable life cycles. The life limitations were 
based upon previous test  experience and engineering judgments. 
To prevent adhesions, the bladders were sub- 
During checkout operations at KSC, a bladder tear  was discovered on the LM-7 
vehicle. The subsequent investigation failed to identify the specific cause of the failure, 
which could not be traced to a material  defect or  to improper pressure  application or 
other handling problems. To ensure that flight tanks did not have tears ,  an X-ray ex- 
amination was implemented after the water was loaded for  flight. Gas leakage checks 
had routinely been used to show that no tear  existed just prior to waterloading. 
This is an example of the "explained" category of failure reports.  No fault could 
Special tes ts  be found with the bladder design or with the manner in which it w a s  used. 
were implemented, however, to verify that the flight units were f ree  of defects after 
completion of prelaunch preparations. 
Redundant water regulator and particulate contamination. - Particulate contamina- 
tion and corrosion were experienced a number of t imes during development and check- 
out. In general, the corrective measures were to progressively reduce the exposures 
to water and to dry the system more thoroughly following use. Even minor corrosion 
resul ts  in the generation of large amounts of particulate contamination. 
water system corrosion was  found in the first several  LM vehicles, including the LTA-8. 
The corrosion occurred in the tubing interior,  where the alodine coating had been de- 
stroyed when the gamah fittings (tube connectors) were swaged in place. 
flushes to replace the coating followed by water flushes to clean the system were 
required. 
Significant 
Chromic acid 
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During checkout of the LM-4 vehicle a t  KSC, a water pressure regulator mal- 
functioned; and corrosion of some of the internal parts was apparent. During the in- 
vestigation of the problem, the sensitivity of the regulator design to particulates was 
a. major finding. 
contaminated. 
and by running for  long durations. 
showed that the design was sensitive to malfunctions caused by particulates, the units 
functioned satisfactorily in test. 
redundancy that additional protection (waterline fi l ters) could not be justified. 
mary water system already contained two regulators in ser ies ,  but the backup system 
had only a single regulator. A redundant regulator in the backup system was added a t  
that time, effective on the LM-5 and subsequent vehicles. 
kit added downstream of the LSC-330-490 water control module. 
tor  (designated LSC- 330-433) had interior working parts identical to the existing 
LSC-330-415 regulators. 
Several bench tes t  series were run with water which was intentionally 
The general findings were that, even though analysis 
The tes ts  imposed difficult conditions by varying system parameters 
Two regulators in se r i e s  apparently provided sufficient 
The pri- 
This was a field modification 
The redundant regula- 
A schematic view of the regulator is shown in figure 27. 
Water pressure regulators that would 
meet the tight specification performance 
Reference requirements were difficult to manufacture 
f rom A R S  and assemble. The large counterbalanced 
diaphragm assembly would sometimes be- 
come misalined, and disassembly and hand 
matching of parts was the practice. Once 
a unit had passed acceptance testing (in- 
dicating that all specifications were met), 
the subsequent performance was good. 
Flight performance was without flaw. 
pressure 
Diaphragm Corrosion in the WMS, which resulted 
in particulate contamination, was not so 
severe that structural integrity was threat- 
ened. Only light, surface-type corrosion 
was found; however, this was significant 
Metering 
poppet 
Regulated 4 
discharge inlet 
water Water f rom a particulate contamination standpoint. 
Extensive testing was performed to  
Figure 27. - Water pressure regulator - demonstrate the effects of iodinated water 
tes ts  basically showed that the use of iodine 
in the concentrations required for  water 
sterility purposes was no more detrimental than the use of water itself. 
nonmetallic materials were tested, including dissimilar coupled samples; and the 
materials showed good overall resistance to corrosion. 
functional schematic. upon material stability in the WMS. These 
Metallic and 
Bacteria filter. - A requirement that no viable organisms be deposited on the 
~_I___- 
moon as a result of systems operation was placed upon the LM ECS. 
condensate enters the sublimator water feedline and is eventually vented overboard as 
low-pressure steam. Micro-organisms contained within this line will not necessarily 
be killed by the vacuum nor filtered out by the sublimator porous plates. Furthermore, 
the contact time of the condensate and the iodinated stored water would not guarantee a 
bacteria "kill, 
The crewman 
particularly of spore-type micro-organisms. 
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A small-pore (0.22 micron absolute) f i l ter  was developed for  the waterline to 
Placement in location B was also possible but would require twice as 
retain the bacteria mechanically. 
in figure 28. 
many fi l ters for  the redundant water separators. 
The unit was to  be placed in location A as illustrated 
Problems with gas blockage, which 
increased the pressure drop and effectively 
blocked the fine fi l ter ,  were encountered. 
The gas in the water came from the water- 
supply tank, which became saturated with 
after filling. The water pressure regulator 
contro l  
Water -* from lank8 module 
,approxlma,ely 
48 to 15 psial 
nitrogen a t  approximately 48 psia shortly Crewman 
condensate 
t 
settings could not be increased to f o 6 e  
more water through the fi l ter  because of 
the limitations imposed by the sublimator 
and by the water separators. Additional 
pumping head requirements on the water 
separators would increase the suit-circuit 
gas pressure drop and thereby require 
revision to the suit fans. High water- 
supply pressure would cause sublimator 
breakthrough. 
Chil led 
dehumidif ied 
su i t  gas ) Chil led mois l  
su i t  oar w 
Redundant 
c /- un i t s  
A> and & represent 
possible water f i l ter  
locations 
Figure 28. - Water bacteria filter 
locations. 
The Interagency Committee on Back 
Contamination (ICBC) reviewed the status 
of the developments and recommended relaxing the requirement concerning bacterial 
deposits from this source. 
the Apollo 11 mission. 
and the cabin gas was dumped directly overboard at  the t imes of lunar exploration. 
A bacterial filter was used on the LM cabin dump valve for  
The requirement for  th i s  f i l ter  was deleted for  later missions. 
Compliance with the ICBC requirements was difficult (if not impossible) with the 
Later developments could have been pursued to possibly provide a 
Also, if the ICBC requirements had 
existing hardware. 
hydrophobic/hydrophilic f i l ter  for  water filtering. 
been imposed early in the development, they probably could have been accommodated 
within the basic design. 
Gas solubility. - - Although gas is mixed with the water, it has not been a problem 
in LM usage. On the LM-4 (Apollo 10) vehicle, there was a crew comment concerning 
the gas that they encountered in the drinking water; but it was not regarded as a prob- 
lem. Gas has caused no problems in water pressure regulation or in sublimator 
operation. 
The gas, which is nitrogen, enters the water by permeating the tank bladders 
following servicing. 
will saturate i t  anyway af ter  loading. 
atmosphere in the ground servicing equipment. 
occurred after tank loading the f i r s t  few times because the water quantity measurement 
device (WQMD) is basically a pressure transducer. As permeation takes place, the 
pressure of the sealed-off gas supply slowly decreases, causing a decrease in the 
WQMD reading and falsely indicating a slow water (or  gas) leak. The rate of decrease 
The water is not deaerated before loading because the nitrogen 
The water is probably saturated with air at one 
The only concern about gas saturation 
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and the level-off point, based on previous test  observations and theoretical gas satura- 
tion data, have been furnished to flight controllers. 
than those predicted indicate a leak, while ra tes  less  than predicted indicate the perme- 
ation phenomenon rather than leakage. 
Pressure decay ra tes  greater 
Orifice problems. - The water pressure regulators were se t  to control their outlet 
pressure from 0.5 t o .  0 psi greater than suit-circuit pressure.  
lines, which provided the reference pressure,  contained small  orifices a t  the suit- 
circuit end. 
pressure if a sense line should break. 
This was  necessary 
I to provide the water pressure required for  sublimator operation. The pressure-sense 
These orifices were provided originally to preclude loss of suit-circuit 
During altitude-chamber manned testing a t  KSC on the LM-3 vehicle, it was noted 
that the water separators were performing poorly. 
dications became high; and there were crew complaints of being warm and humid. The 
high carbon dioxide indications resulted from water being iorced into the sensor because 
of the location of the sensor tubes. It w a s  subsequently determined that the orifice in 
the water regulator sense line was plugged; and some unknown pressure was trapped in 
the sense line, causing an artificially high reference pressure.  This caused the sub- 
limator supply pressure to be abnormally high, which required the water separators 
to pump against a high head pressure.  Under these conditions, little o r  no condensate 
would be pumped out of the suit circuit. The factory checkout method verified all func- 
tions of the sense line except whether i t  was actually open to the suit circuit. With the 
unit in place, these orifices and protective screens were carefully removed to avoid 
particulate contamination in the suit  circuit on the LM-3 vehicle and on all subsequent 
vehicles. 
reliability of the system plumbing. 
Eventually, the carbon dioxide in- 
The decision to remove the orifices was based on the extraordinary high 
The failure to detect the blocked orifices a t  the factory resulted from checkout 
limitations that were imposed by certain aspects of the spacecraft system design. For 
example, the main checkout restriction imposed by the design was caused by the suit 
fans, which could accept full bus voltage only at  operational (reduced) pressures.  At 
sea  level pressure,  the fan voltage had to be dropped to 15 volts by ground-support 
equipment to avoid overheating the fan motors. 
w a s  thus restricted to KSC, where the manned altitude-chamber test  was run. It w a s  
always desired to detect all faults a t  the factory before shipment of the vehicle. The 
factory checkouts were made as complete as possible, but sometimes they left some 
small  portion of the system incompletely tested until later. 
Actual testing involving the suit circuit 
A similar restriction on checkout, because of design, was the absolute pressure 
If all pressure con- 
/ @  
I 
I 
regulation of some devices. 
KSC, where subatmospheric pressures  were finally encountered. 
t ro l  could have been gage-type or  differential-type control, the checkout job could have 
been more thoroughly performed at the factory. 
This deferred end-to-end pressure regulation tes ts  to 
1. 
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CERTIF ICATION TESTING PROGRAM 
General Scope 
The ECS design concept of modularized subassemblies led to an early decision 
to  perform certification testing at the module level for examining and verifying all 
possible component interactions during dynamic testing. 
that any field failure of a single component would require replacement of the complete 
module o r  lowest replaceable element, i t  is reasonable to assume that certification 
should be performed at the same vehicle replacement level of assembly. 
Because i t  had been stipulated 
3 
Feasibility testing. - Design feasibility tes ts  were conducted at  the component and 
s u b s y s z ( m o d u 1 e )  levels. 
design and to establish performance curves, and the subsystem (module) level tes ts  
were performed to identify component interaction and to verify that system design per- 
formance requirements were met. 
and was made from controlled procedures and drawings. 
The component level tes ts  were primarily used to verify 
The hardware used was virtually production grade 
Design verification testing. - Because production- type hardware w a s  used during 
feasibility testing and very'little redesign was required following feasibility tests,  the 
design verification test  requirement was deleted. 
Formal qualification. - Two se ts  of flight hardware were subjected to logic-group 
( m o d u w s t i n g .  
consisting of mission-design-extreme environments, and one se t  was subjected to two 
normal mission-level environment tes ts  plus ground environment tests.  
One se t  of hardware was tested to design limit certification levels 
Design changes resulting from component failures during initial certification 
testing. plus component additions and redesign imposed by changes in system require- 
ments, were responsible for incorporating a delta qualification program following the 
initial logic-grnup qualification program. The delta qualification of new and modified 
hardware assured a more realist ic certification by using the original modules as  test 
beds (or  fixtures) during testing. 
_____ Man-rating. . - To certify the life support section of the ECS, a complete test  
facility was built at the prime contractor site. The man-rating test  facility consisted 
of a vacuum chamber, a vacuum system, a data system, and a life support section of 
the LM ECS, which was installed in the simulated LM cabin of the vacuum chamber. 
The facility was designated the LM Internal Environment Simulator (IES). 
Using the IES, the ECS man-rating was accomplished in two steps. The f i r s t  
s tep (phase I) used some preproduction hardware which differed from production hard- 
ware only in physical layout. 
which was modified to provide instrumentation points necessary for  gathering para- 
metric data. 
tes ts ,  valuable crew familiarization and confidence were attained. Following these 
tests,  the test  chamber was moved to  the NASA Manned Spacecraft Center, where i t  
was used for  further evaluations and provided some flight crew familiarization. 
The second step (phase 11) used production hardware 
Although no design changes o r  modifications were identified during these 
Thermal-vacuum tests.  - To ensure compatibility between all subsystems during 
vehicle exposure to expected environments, the LTA-8 vehicle was built and installed 
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in a special thermal-vacuum chamber, in which six manned tests were run at design- 
extreme metabolic and thermal loads to verify flight worthiness. 
Feasibil i ty Testing and Design Ver i f icat ion Testing 
The original concept for  hardware development was to conduct feasibility testing 
on preproduction hardware for  the purpose of component and part  selection, perform- 
ance evaluation, and design concept verification. These tests - which included per- 
formance, fluid compatibility, endurance, and thermal exposure - were conducted on 
the component, logic-group, and system levels of hardware buildup. Satisfactory 
completion of feasibility testing released hardware for  production. Design verification 
testing would then be conducted with production hardware. As the hardware develop- 
ment phase progressed, the preproduction hardware had the appearance of production 
hardware; that is, very few "hogouts" or  heavyweight i tems were made for  feasibility 
purposes. Therefore, cri t ical  portions of the design verification testing were included 
in the design feasibility program. 
No definite limit was set on quantities of hardware required to undergo feasibility 
At least three of each item went through component, logic-group, and system testing. 
level feasibility testing. 
Several hardware redesigns were required to meet feasibility test  requirements. 
The following paragraphs indicate the type of redesigns required to meet specific test  
requirements. 
Performance. .~ - The water separator (LSC- 330- 109) had excessive water carry-  
over. 
blocked to increase the velocity of the suit gas through the separator for increasing the 
starting torque. 
The pitot tube was redesigned to prevent splashing. Nine stator vanes were 
The primary sublimator (LSC-330-209) could not meet the required thermal per- 
The manufacturing process of brazing the fins to the porous plate was formance. 
changed to welding to increase the sublimation area. 
porous plates w a s  required s o  that the finer pore orientation was a lways  uniformly in 
the same direction. 
motor efficiency w a s  increased to meet performance requirements. 
Control of the installation of 
The suit fan (LSC-330-118) rotor profile was changed, and the 
Structural. . .~ - The water/glycol accumulator (LSC-330-210) pressure curve was 
nonlinear. 
canister cover (LSC-370- 127) was redesigned to meet torque requirements. 
A spring guide was added to prevent the spring from dragging. The LiOH 
Leakage. . -~ - The water check valve (LSC- 330-401/492) seating arrangement was 
changed from a spring-loaded poppet to a flapper-type poppet, the oxygen shutoff valve 
(LSC-330-304) seat  was changed to an aluminum hard seat,  and the poppet material was 
changed to Ke l -F  to meet leakage requirements. 
Stability. . _  ___ - The cabin dump valve (LSC-330-307) main poppet spring preload was 
increased to meet vibration requirements. (See fig. 24. ) 
35 
Endurance. - The suit fan (LSC-330-118) motor bearing grease was changed to 
Andok-C, and the percent of grease fill was reduced to meet endurance requirements. 
The cabin fan (LSC- 330- 102) motor bearing grease deteriorated and was changed to 
G- 2 6 lubricant. 
Qual i f  ication Testing 
Design limit testing. - Design limit testing was performed to verify the functional 
capability of ECS components during or following subjection to environmental loads 
approaching the ultimate levels for  which the equipment was designed. One complete 
se t  of production flight hardware was subjected to the following environments. 
1. Humidity and temperature (combined) 
2. Salt atmosphere (noncabin hardware) 
3. Sand and dust 
4. Vibration 
5. Acceleration 
6. Thermal vacuum 
7. Shock 
8. EM1 (as applicable) 
9. Burst pressure (as applicable) 
Most hardware failures that occurred during testing were caused by improper 
test  setups (i. e . ,  incorrect polarity at the test  equipment/test item electrical interface 
and excessive test  item leakage ra tes  as a result of contamination introduced from test  
instrumentation, test  a r ea  environments, and test  fluid/gas supply sources) and im- 
proper manufacturing procedures, all of which could have caused component failure 
during normal operation, even without the design limit test  environments. 
failures that were attributable to the actual test  environments and that require sub- 
sequent redesign were few. 
the failed components, the fixture mode, and the redesign necessary to successfully 
complete qualification. 
Hardware 
The following paragraphs indicate - by test  environment - 
Electromagnetic interference: Some cases of radiated and conducted EM1 which 
occurred during this test  resulted in adding suppression to some electrical components 
and in modifying test  requirements for  those which bordered on test  limitations. The 
out-of-specification conditions in many cases involved switching circuitry and not the 
components directly, s o  no failed hardware listing is made. 
Vibration (lunar ascent/descent and earth-launch loads): The cabin pressure 
switch (LSC- 330- 323) failure modes were out of specification, and contact chatter was 
of sufficient duration to cause activation of hardware in the circuit. Redesign of this 
unit included shock mounting and slight changes to the specification pressure bands for 
activation and deactivation. 
Functional (operational, cycles): The water check valve (LSC- 330-401/492) 
failure mode was excessive reverse  leakage caused by contamination of the check valve 
seat. Redesign incorporated a much softer flapper-type seat which had a greater sur- 
face a rea  and less susceptibility to  contamination. 
The suit-circuit diverter valve (LSC-330- 112) failure mode was an increase in 
handle torque beyond the specification limits and was caused by burring of the valve- 
shaft sleeve. Redesign resulted in replacement of the sleeve with one made f rom a 
higher Rockwell number (hardness) material. 
Subsequent to design limit qualification completion, many hardware design changes 
were incorporated to increase reliability and to delete flammable materials. Where 
applicable, delta qualification testing was performed to ensure that hardware operation 
was not affected. 
Endurance qualification ~ _____ testing. - The endurance qualification testing, which con- 
sisted of two mission simulations plus ground checkout time, was performed to verify 
the functional capability of ECS components during or following subjection to normal 
environmental loads. One complete set of production flight hardware was subjected to 
the following environments. 
1. Integration and checkout (cycles, operation) 
2. Vibration and temperature 
3. Thermal and vacuum 
4. Corrosive contaminants 
5. Oxygen atmosphere (oxygen, temperature, humidity) 
6. Shock 
7. Acceleration 
The failures that occurred during this certification tes t  were (for the greatest 
par t )  characteristic of long-term operation, test  r ig  induced contamination, and im- 
proper manufacturing procedures. As in design limit qualification, the failures that 
were directly attributable to  the certification environment loads were few. 
ing paragraphs indicate by tes t  environment the failed component, the failure mode, and 
the redesign necessary to complete endurance qualification successfully. 
The follow- 
Vibration (lunar ascent/descent and earth-launch loads): The cabin relief valve 
(LSC-330-30'7) had excessive leakage, which was attributed to contamination. Disas- 
sembly revealed that the foam material used as a volume filler had cracked. Redesign 
resulted in replacement of the foam material with molded silicone rubber. 
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Integration and checkout (endurance qualification): The water check valve 
(LSC-330-401/492) failure mode was identical to the failure which occurred during 
design limit testing. 
was also used in the retest  for  this qualification. 
The redesigned unit used to complete design limit qualification 
The suit-circuit diverter valve (LSC-330- 112) failed to return to the egress  posi- 
tion during electrical actuation. 
between detent and shaft. Redesign resulted in a modification of the shaft detent cavity. 
The failure was identified as a jammed detent ball 
' 
The secondary glycol-loop sublimator (LSC-330-224) failed to meet performance 
cr i ter ia  after 100 hours of operation. The fai lure  was attributed to excessive braze 
flowing, incorrect porous-plate orientation, and particulate contamination. Redesign 
of the sublimator involved installing the porous plate by welding instead of brazing, 
modifying manufacturing procedures, and using MSC-approved water. 
Subsequent to endurance qualification, many hardware design changes were in- 
corporated to increase reliability and to eliminate flammable materials. Where appli- 
cable, delta qualification was performed to ensure that hardware operation had not been 
affected. 
In tegrated Subsystems a n d  Vehic le  Test ing 
Internal environment simulator. - The IES tes t  program was generated to man- 
__.. 
r a t e  the L M  ECS prior to man-rating at  the vehicle level. 
a vacuum chamber, a cabin volume pressure shell, all ECS components which were 
required for  life support, and cabin wall temperature control to simulate mission 
thermal loads. 
The test  facility consisted of 
The IES test  program comprised four tests:  one unmanned, one contractor 
The following summary covers test  manned, and two manned by MSC astronauts. 
objectives of each test .  
Test 1 (unmanned): Test 1 was designed to provide assurance of specification 
performance of the ECS when exposed to design environments. Minor problems associ- 
ated with the metabolic simulator caused deviations from test  procedures, but adequate 
data were compiled to enable proceeding to manned testing. 
Test  2 (manned - contractor pilot): Test 2 was designed to man-rate the ECS 
and to provide confidence for  continued manned testing. 
sufficient subjective comments before, during, and after the test  to "debug" the test  
procedures adequately and to identify possible hazards to man. This test  was highly 
successful, and only minor procedure changes were made prior to the next test. 
The contractor pilot provided 
Tests 3 and 4 (manned - MSC astronauts): Tests 3 and 4 were identical to  
test  2, and the only anomaly which occurred was in a negative suit-pressure relief 
valve (special ground- test  item). During cabin depressurization, the suit circuit was 
noted to be following the cabin pressure.  After recycling the cabin pressure,  this 
ground-test valve sealed off properly; and no recurrence of this anomaly occurred. 
The only performance characteristic worthy of note was a temperature rise 
between a point directly upstream of the suit-isolation valve and the suit inlet. 
temperature rise (approximately 9" F) was apparently caused by conduction across  
the isolation valve (a single two-port valve which controls the "cold" flow into the suit 
and the ?'hot'' return flow from the suit) and between the suit supply and return umbil- 
ical hoses. 
w a s  below specification level; and no redesign was required. With the exception of 
the aforementioned minor anomalies, the IES tes t  program was satisfactory. 
This 
Even though this heat loss  was not predicted? the suit inlet temperature 
Special testing. - The liquid tes t  r i g  (LTR) was a geometrical reproduction of the 
lunar module environmental control subsystem HTS and WMS and was designed to pro- 
vide a means for  testing various configurations to  determine heat-transfer character- 
is t ics  and flow distributions for  various cold-plate heat loads and flow conditions. 
program was conducted in two distinct configurations, one being the LM-1 vehicle sys- 
tem (a flight development vehicle which had additional cold-plated equipment and an 
automated water system for  unmanned flight) and the other being a LM-4 vehicle system 
(a lightweight lunar landing vehicle with all development equipment removed). 
This 
The flow balance phases of LTR testing were satisfactorily completed for  both the 
LM- 1 vehicle and LM-4 vehicle configurations. 
was during the special test  described in the following paragraph. 
The only noteworthy test  discrepancy 
A special test  was conducted to  verify the capability of the water/glycol ground- 
support equipment to  adequately remove particulate contamination from the water/ 
glycol to below specification levels before and after vehicle servicing. Review of the 
test report showed that water/glycol samples were taken prior to LTR servicing; but, 
because of inadequate quantities of water/glycol after system servicing? no samples 
were taken. At test  completion, the water/glycol w a s  drained from the LTR and re- 
ported to  be qualitatively "very dirty. " 
The successful flight operation of the HTS and the WMS would tend to indicate 
that the LTR program was highly successful, but one major vehicle anomaly that oc- 
curred during subsequent ground testing indicated an area of inadequate certification. 
This vehicle problem, which should have been identified during the LTR testing, was 
the breakthrough of the secondary loop sublimators of the LTA-8 vehicle. 
discussion under '' Sublimator breakthrough problems. ") 
(See previous 
Lunar module test  article. - The following paragraphs describe tes ts  performed 
- --- 
on the lunar module test  art icle.  
Thermal vacuum: To verify design requirements for the Apollo lunar module be- 
fore  manned flight, a special lunar module tes t  art icle,  designated LTA-8, was built 
and installed in a space simulation vacuum chamber. Because the LM program called 
fo r  orbital flights prior to a lunar landing, the LTA-8 test program also was set up in 
two phases. Each test program was designed to provide environments and time lines 
simulating expected mission loads. 
phase show that few hardware problems were encountered during manned testing, those 
which did occur more than justify the importance of manned-integrated systems testing. 
Although the following summaries for each test  
The LTA-8/LM-3 configuration (manned earth-orbital simulation - cold case): 
The LM test art icle was installed in the space simulation chamber, and the thermal 
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environments were stabilized for the cold extreme of expected temperatures. The ECS 
anomalies which occurred during the cold test were for  the most part  connected with 
special ground-test hardware, procedure e r ro r s ,  and instrumentation anomalies. 
Descriptions of two significant failures follow. 
The water separator (LSC-330- 109) failed to start (during the second manning 
phase) until the third attempt. It was concluded that residual water f rom the previous 
manning phase was causing excessive friction which counteracted the low (gas flow) 
torque, thereby preventing a startup of the water separator.  
identified during component testing; and a redesigned water separator,  which develops 
more starting torque from the same gas flow, was certified for  use  in flight vehicles. 
The carbon dioxide sensor (LSC-330- 150) was indicating carbon dioxide partial  
This problem had been 
pressures  greater than 30 mm Mg during the second manning phase. Postflight analysis 
indicated that the sensor had failed because of environment incompatibility. Subsequent 
sensors  for flight use were redesigned to reduce sensor susceptibility to moisture, to 
vibration, and to known circuit problems. 
The LTA- 8/LM-3 configuration (manned earth-orbital simulation - hot case): 
The space simulation chamber was stabilized for  the hot extreme of expected flight 
temperatures.  As in the cold test, most failures o r  anomalies were in special ground- 
test  hardware and instrumentation. One significant failure, which justified major sys-  
tem redesign, is summarized in the following paragraph. 
The secondary water/glycol loop (a backup life support and black-box cooling 
system) w a s  designed to use the potable water system as an accumulator. 
of the secondary loop punctured an isolation disk between the water system and the 
secondary glycol loop; and, a t  the same time, water was supplied to the secondary loop 
sublimators. During LTA- 8 testing, the secondary loop glycol pressure was greater 
than the water system pressure a t  the time of secondary loop startup, causing the 
water/glycol mixture to enter the potable water system and to be supplied to the sec- 
ondary loop sublimators. 
below that of water, no ice layer was formed on the sublimator plates and breakthrough 
occurred. 
Selection 
Because a water/glycol mixture has a freezing temperature 
A s  a result of the failure, the secondary glycol loop was redesigned, the potable 
This configuration was  certi-  
water/glycol loop interface w a s  removed, and a glycol accumulator (LSC-330-210) 
identical to the primary loop accumulator was installed. 
fied in the subsequent LTA-8/LM-5 tests.  With the exception of the secondary glycol 
loop failure, a l l  ECS test objectives were satisfactorily completed. 
The LTA-8/LM- 5 configuration (manned lunar landing simulation): The LTA- 8/ 
LM-5 thermal-vacuum tests  were performed to verify that the LM-5 vehicle thermal 
design and thermal control system were adequate for  worst-case (predicted) lunar land- 
ing environments. 
mission simulations. 
temperature for the cabin temperature control valve (LSC-330-203). 
sequent design change eliminated the cabin heat exchanger and temperature control 
valve, no discussion of the test  anomaly is given. 
The ECS performed within predictions for both the hot and cold 
The only anomaly which occurred was an out-of-specification 
Because a sub- 
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The LTA- 8/LM- 3 and LTA- 8/LM- 5 thermal-vacuum tes t s  satisfied the following 
tes t  objectives: 
1. To demonstrate the capability of the vehicle environmental control system to 
provide a habitable environment in the cabin and pressure suit with the equipment op- 
erated in the earth-orbital and lunar landing mission- oriented thermal-vacuum 
environments 
2. To demonstrate the capability of the WMS to supply water to the boilers 
properly in quantities consistent with heat levels generated by the equipment operating 
in all modes consistent with representative earth-orbital and lunar landing mission- 
oriented thermal-vacuum environments 
3. To demonstrate the capability of the primary HTS to accept and to effectively 
dissipate the thermal loads generated by the electrical equipment and a crew when 
operated in modes consistent with earth-orbital and lunar landing mission-oriented 
thermal-vacuum environments 
4. To demonstrate that the cabin pressure-shell  leak ra te  will not exceed 
0 . 2  pound per  hour (The leakage shall be measured before the f i r s t  manning, when 
the crew is not in the cabin, with a cabin pressure of 4 .8  f 0.2  psia and the vehicle 
operating in a representative earth-orbital and lunar landing mission-oriented thermal- 
vacuum environment. ) 
5. To demonstrate that, during unmanned and manned operations, the cabin 
atmosphere and suit loop contain no contaminants which would have an unacceptable 
physiological effect on the crew 
6 .  To demonstrate the capability of the secondary HTS to accept and effectively 
dissipate the heat generated by electrical  equipment, mounted on redundant cold plates 
and cold rails, when operated in modes consistent with earth-orbital and lunar landing 
mission-oriented thermal-vacuum environments 
7. To show acceptable cabin depressurization operation under cold lunar con- 
ditions with the antibacteria filter installed on the cabin relief and dump valve (Cabin 
depressurization from 5.0 psia to 0.08 psia through the forward relief and dump valve 
shall not require more than 310 seconds. ) 
8. To show that the primary lithium hydroxide cartridge can be replaced while 
the cabin is depressurized and while the crew is supported by the vehicle environmental 
control systems 
9. To determine the cabin temperature gradient, with and without cabin fan 
operation, when crew activity is at a low level 
! 
VEHl CLE AND ACCEPTANCE TEST1 NG 
Acceptance tes t s  were conducted on all deliverable ECS components or assemblies 
to provide assurance that the equipment performance was within the limits of the design 
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parameters  and that the equipment was f ree  f rom material, construction, workmanship, 
and functional deficiencies. Pr ior  to vehicle installation, most equipment received a 
preinstallation test to ensure that no damage had occurred during handling, shipment, 
or storage. 
The vehicle level of acceptance consisted primarily of tests conducted on equip- 
ment installed in the vehicle, f rom individual section level to "fullup" (complete) sys- 
tems  test. A Customer Acceptance Readiness Review (CARR) was conducted on each 
vehicle for increased levels of testing. Phase I CARR was conducted after subsystem 
installation and served to identify constraints to subsystem testing. 
conducted prior to the s ta r t  of Final Engineering Acceptance Tests  (FEAT). Phase JII 
CARR was conducted after FEAT to assess the readiness of vehicle acceptance and to 
obtain authorization to ship. 
Phase I1 CARR was 
The basic intent of acceptance testing was to "wring out" completely an item on 
a component level. Unique test  functions were generally impractical on the vehicle 
level. 
t es t s  as vibration, thermal cycling, proof pressure  of tanks, and indepth component 
performance. Test functions were repeated only when the previous test  resul ts  were 
violated by a change in stimuli o r  by a different installation procedure. In general, 
tes t  functions on a component were reduced as the component progressed to the next 
level of assembly. 
These tests were performed on the component o r  module only and included such 
FL I GHT EXPER I ENCE 
Lunar Module 1 (Apollo 5) 
The primary objectives fo r  the LM- 1 vehicle mission were to flight-verify the 
ascent and descent propulsion systems and the abort staging function. Because the 
vehicle was unmanned, only the ECS thermal control and its supporting functions were 
used during the mission. Life support hardware was included in the vehicle but was 
deactivated. 
The glycol temperatures remained within predicted values throughout the mission. 
No anomalies were observed during the mission; however, ascent water tank number 2 
instrumentation indicated a small  leak prior to launch. No water leakage w a s  detected, 
and a leak of the tank pressurant gas was suspected. The degree of leakage would not 
compromise the mission because water sufficient to complete the mission and pres- 
surant gas were known to be available. 
Lunar Module 3 (Apollo 9 )  
The ECS was activated three t imes and operated normally during the 26 hours of 
manned operation. All ECS operating procedures required for  the lunar mission were 
verified. All components functioned according to plan with the exception of a valve 
position indicator on the LM pilot suit flow control valve, which gave e r ra t ic  indica- 
tions. 
control any system operations. 
This position indicator provides information for  ground controllers and does not 
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The crew reported that the cabin noise was excessive during helmets-off opera- 
The noise was caused primarily by operation of the cabin fans and the glycol tion. 
pumps. The flight procedures were changed to limit cabin fan operation at  the discre- 
tion of the crew, and a noise reduction survey was initiated for the glycol pumps. A 
design change was made, effective on later vehicles, to reduce pumping system noise. 
Lunar Module 4 (Apollo 10) 
The ECS was activated for  approximately 12 hours and performed satisfactorily. 
Loss of cabin pressure during LM jettison provided an opportunity to evaluate the ECS 
under a rapid decompression failure. 
verified when the suit loop locked up at 4.4 psia. Additionally, satisfactory perform- 
ance of the cabin pressure  control logic was verified. 
resented a severe test  of the ECS, and all ECS functions were nominal. 
The automatic functions of the suit loop were 
This unplanned situation rep- 
The primary lithium hydroxide cartridge was returned to earth for analysis 
because of an indicated high rate of carbon dioxide increase, followed later by a de- 
crease.  
of cartridge malfunction. It was concluded that the lithium hydroxide chemical con- 
version variations, combined with sensor tolerances, accounted for  the flight 
performance. 
Chemical and X-ray diffraction analyses of the cartridge indicated no evidence 
The crew reported that the drinking water contained gas. The nitrogen, used to 
pressurize the water system prior  to launch, penetrates the tank bladder and slowly 
saturates the water at  the f i l l  p ressure  of 48 psia. As the absolute pressure is re-  
duced, the dissolved nitrogen is released. The water hose and connecting plumbing 
were not serviced with water, and this entrapped air initially added to the problem. 
Prelaunch procedures were changed to include servicing the water hose and connecting 
plumbing. 
The crew reported that the cabin was noisy, primarily because of the glycol 
pump. 
because i t  was not needed. 
glycol pump noise. 
One cabin fan was used for approximately 30 minutes and was then turned off 
The use of molded earpieces significantly attenuated the 
Lunar Module 5 (Apollo 11) 
The ECS satisfactorily supported all lunar operations with only minor exceptions. 
Depressurization of the cabin for  the EVA required more time than predicted. 
data indicate that the cabin pressure  transducer was reading high at the low end of i t s  
range; consequently, the crew could have opened the hatch sooner if the t rue pressure  
had been known. Additionally, the requirement to use the bacteria filter which snaps 
onto the cabin dump valve was deleted for  future missions. It was known that this 
f i l ter  slows down the gas flow, thus extending the cabin dump time slightly. 
The 
The carbon dioxide sensor  output became er ra t ic  after lunar ascent. The carbon 
dioxide sensor samples the suit-circuit supply gas f rom a vent line connected to the 
condensate drain tank that was used during lunar surface activities. It is probable that 
43 
some free condensate entered the sample line and was drawn into the carbon dioxide 
sensor. Any free water in the optics section of the sensor will disturb the IR signal 
and cause erratic performance. 
f rom the drain tank, the vent line was relocated upstream of the suit fan on later 
vehicles. 
To preclude the introduction of water into the sensor 
During the sleep period on the lunar surface, the crewmen reported that they 
were too cold to sleep. Analysis of the conditions experienced indicated that, once the 
crewmen were in a cold condition, there was not enough heat available in the ECS to 
return them to a comfortable condition. In addition to  the required procedural changes 
which were designed to maintain heat in the suit circuit, hammocks were provided for  
subsequent missions to improve crew comfort and to reduce heat conduction from the 
crewmen. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Several generalized conclusions can be made f rom the development experience of 
the lunar module environmental control subsystem. 
state-of-the-art advances received considerable attention, and these were successfully 
overcome. 
The development problems of the 
The discovery of a defect or an out-of-tolerance condition was followed by the 
determination of i t s  cause. 
prevent recurrence, and this method oi control proved to be successful. 
The most positive corrective action was then instituted to 
Most of the problems experienced were caused by some human, small  e r r o r  
which resulted in an imperfection in a unit. The system of checks and rechecks was 
quite successful in uncovering defects during ground testing as evidenced by consider- 
able successes in flight. 
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